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EU accession requires, inter alia, free movements of capital. If a massive capital 
outflow occurs, the central banks from the accession or acceding countries may 
carry two types of intervention: on money market, and introducing restrictions on 
capital account. The paper explains when is recommendable to initiate one or 
other type of intervention, quantifying the intervention costs and introducing the 
idea of a minim ceiling the net foreign assets may not drop beneath. The model 
is tested on Romania data, and results assess that a decrease into the net 
foreign assets up to 20% should call for central bank intervention only on money 
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  11. Introduction 
European Union accession implicitly infers capital account liberalization. As 
economic practice has exhibited, some problems might come up during the 
liberalization process, due to both net major capitals inflows or outflows. This 
paper examines only the problems arisen from capitals exit, and strives to frame 
the best reaction a central bank might originate in order to prevent the 
exacerbation the balance of payments and other macroeconomic variables 
imbalances. 
It is most likely that in the following years the acceding, accession and candidate 
countries will face net inflows, not outflows, due to the following reasons: 
(i) Catching-up the EU members requires for the Central, Southeastern and 
Eastern transition countries to gain higher economic growth rates. Higher 
productivity will bring on foreign capital. 
(ii) Curbing the inflation will increase the money demand, and the supply could 
arrive both from inside the country, but also from the outside. 
(iii) Disinflation process implies higher real interest rates and currency 
appreciation, which will invite foreign capitals (Buch and Piazolo, 2001). 
Additionally, Gruben (2001) finds that any measure that eliminates the 
restrictions on capital movements could generate a cutback in the inflation rate 
by 3%. 
It is also possible that the inflow or outflow pattern scores no significant change 
in pace and volume. Begg (2001) assesses that the EU members recorded the 
biggest capital inflows a few years before their entrance into the Economic and 
Monetary Union. Therefore it might be possible that the inflows towards the 
acceding, accession and candidate countries face the same pattern, and not to 
gain power as the EU accession moment is drawing near. 
Whatever the pattern would be, the speculative fear remains. The backbone 
central bank arms in order to fight against advert to the manipulation of the 
interest rates, official reserves (and exchange rates implicitly), required reserves 
and/or restrictions in free movements of capital. 
  2Bringing in capital movements restrictions in order to counteract the speculative 
outflows is an exceptional measure, and can be drafted just for limited periods of 
time. Some papers (for example, Dooley, 1996; Edwards, 2000; Frankel, 1996; 
Stotsky, 1996) unveil that new restrictions on capital movements are not so 
efficient solution as it might seem. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2000), Dornbusch 
(2001), Edison and Reinhart (2001), Edwards (1999), Gregorio and others 
(2000), canvassing the effectiveness of the capital controls in some Asian 
countries affected by the financial crisis, reach the same conclusions. 
On the other hand, the opponents of free movements of capital plead their 
position arguing that the benefits from liberalization do not excel the costs raised 
by the occurrence or even exacerbation of the macroeconomic unbalances. 
Kraay (1998), testing the hypothesis the capital account liberalization enforces 
the financial sector and improves the quality of the prudential regulations (curbing 
the systemic risk), reaches that the relation is almost never positive and 
significant. The liberalization process can also be accompanied by the contagion 
effect with negative outcomes for financial sector. Schinasi and Smith (1999) 
assess that contagion effect may occur in a balance of payment crisis when the 
international investors restructure their portfolio, entailing the liquidation of their 
positions from countries unaffected by crises. 
Keeping or bringing in new capital restrictions should also take into account the 
possible consequences that may turn into costs: 
(i) Capital movements restrictions may be a negative signal for foreign investors 
that the authorities are not able to deal or to solve the structural problems. This 
decrease in trust may generate a foreign capital blench (Bartolini and Drazen, 
1994). 
(ii) These restrictions cannot be substitutes for economic and social reforms. 
(iii) It is not so clear, nor in theory or in practice, if bringing in new restrictions will 
cut the volatility. Buch, Heinrich and Pierdioch (1998) argue that new restrictions 
might drive an exchange rate overshooting because, from the economic point of 
view, this measure is like a negative shock on domestic interest rates. 
  3Overall, the process of capital account liberalization as a normal step towards 
accession is a challenge for the Central, Southeastern and Eastern European 
central banks. The answer in a potential distress that might jeopardize the 
financial stability acquires two main choices: actions on money market, and 
administrative restrictions for capital movements. Both types of interventions bear 
specific costs, and the central bank will choose that intervention that offers the 
same effect at the lowest cost. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section explains why we consider 
being more efficient for a central bank to focus on the net foreign assets instead 
of the official reserves. It also describes the alternatives of reaction for a central 
bank if a significant capital outflow occurs and the net foreign assets are 
triggered below a certain threshold. The third and forth sections propose and 
explain the models framed in order to quantify the costs of the central bank 
reaction. Comparing the cost of reaction on money market with the cost 
encompassed by imposing administrative restrictions on capital flows, we acquire 
the optimum reaction, as a function of the level of the net foreign assets. In the 
fifth section we apply the methodology developed into the fore sections, using the 
database for Romania. The last section concludes the main aspects of the paper. 
 
2. Net foreign assets management and capital account liberalization 
Focusing on the level of official reserves during the liberalization process might 
be less efficient than monitoring net foreign assets (NFA), due to the following: 
(i) The information regarding the net foreign assets is more significant than the 
information on official reserves for the central bank policy makers in order to 
highlight some trends from the banking system and to accordingly trim the 
policies. 
(ii) Net foreign assets are the correspondent of the financial flow with the world, 
and the dynamic of the NFA reflects straight and concise the balance of payment 
evolution; it also might signal the potential weaknesses of the liberalization 
process. Additionally, during the forecasting of the NFA evolution, any significant 
deviation from the trend might be a signal for the policy maker that a speculative 
  4flow has occurred, or a sound inflow has arisen, but the sterilization costs will be 
important. 
(iii) The level of monetization from the Central, Southeastern and Eastern 
European economies is much below the EU average. Net foreign assets are an 
important broad money counterpart and a NFA increase entails a non-inflationary 
broad money expansion.  
Let’s assume a central bank aims to promote an optimal level for the net foreign 
assets. This level is either an exogenous variable (i.e., agreed during the 
negotiations with the international financial organizations or an economic target 
committed during the accession process; reaching the level is binding), or is the 
outcome from some restrictions inflicted into the NFA dynamic. In order to 












































NFA = net foreign assets (denominated in foreign currency) 
NFAd = net foreign assets (denominated in domestic currency) 
CS = nominal exchange rate (an increase in exchange rate implies the 
depreciation of the domestic currency) 










 the rate of change for CS 
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Thus, 
nfa’ = NFA*(µ − cs) ⇒ 
NFA(t) = NFA(t0)*e
(µ - cs)t, where (µ-cs) is a constant 
The restraint in this equation advert to the (µ - cs) (i.e., if the remonetization of 
the economy is envisaged, than the condition will entail that (µ - cs) should be 




i t cs NFA NFA ) 1 (
0 − + = + µ    (1) 
where: 
NFA
op = optimal level for NFA 
cs − µ  = optimal growth rate for NFA 
If NFA drop (or there is an anticipation that will drop) below the optimum level 
(NFA
op), central bank will react, either on money market, or bringing in 
administrative restrictions on capital account. The type of the reaction will be 
chosen balancing the cost entitled by every category of reaction. Because the 
administrative reaction is very brutal and is used just in exceptional 
circumstances, we bring the idea of a minimum ceiling for the NFA (H). Thus, the 
central bank reaction imposing restrictions on capital movements emerge as a 
possibility just in case the NFA level drops beneath the barrier level H. The 
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  6There are the following situations: 
I. NFAt ≥ NFA
op: it is not necessary for the central bank to cut in, because 
the actual net foreign assets are above the level for the optimum net 
foreign assets; 
II.  H < NFAt < NFA
op: the central bank might react through open market 
operations in order to promote the target. The cost of such intervention is 
described in the third section; 
III. NFAt  ≤ H: the central bank might react either on money market, or 
imposing administrative restrictions on capital movements, according to 
the lowest cost of intervention. The cost of administrative measures is 
modeled into the forth section. 
As we have already mentioned, the paper studies the situations described by 
cases no. II and III, and the next sections explain them in details. 
 
3. The cost of money market intervention 
The relation between net foreign assets and the elements of the balance and 
payment is: 
RZ CK CC NFA ∆ + + = ∆     (2) 
where
1: 
CC = current account balance;  
CK = capital account balance; 
RZ = foreign reserves; 
Moreover: 
CC = E-X = f(Y, Y
*, CS1/CS0)     (3) 
CK = g(r-r
*, CS1/CS0)       ( 4 )  
                                                           
1 All the variables from (2) are denominated in foreign currency, end of period 
  7where: 
E, X = export, import respectively 
Y, Y
* = gross domestic product, gross domestic product of the rest of the 
world, respectively 
r-r
* = spread between domestic and foreign interest rate 
CS1/CS0 = cs = rate of domestic currency depreciation 
Due to the fact the paper studies just short-term evolution of the net foreign 
assets, especially from speculative determinants, we may consider Y, Y
* and r
* 
being constant. We rewrite (2), using (3) and (4): 
, ) , ( cs r cs r h NFA β α + = = ∆   
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  8From relation (6) we notice that, in order to bring the NFA at the optimum level, a 
central bank may intervene on money market either by increasing interest rates, 
or by depreciating domestic currency, or both. It is worth to mention that, in the 
Central, Southeastern and Eastern European countries, appealing to the 
intervention through the exchange rate is hardly grasped, for the least following 
reasons: (i) the ongoing need for curbing inflation, (ii) the imperative to carry on 
the real convergence process, and (iii) the exchange rate regime that pegs more 
or less the domestic currency by other currency (euro, ordinarily). The reaction to 
alter exchange rate, depreciating the domestic currency, might jeopardize the 
above-mentioned processes. That is way the Central, Southeastern and Eastern 
European countries dispose almost exclusively of the interest rate as a tool of 
intervention. 
Assume the UIP relation: 
cst = c + θ(rt – rt
*),      (7)   
where c is a constant, and θ intercept the hypothesis relaxation from the UIP 
(free movements of capital, rational expectations, free float regime, etc.) 
Subtracting in (7), and assuming r* constant, we obtain: 
∆cs = cst - cst-1 =  θ(rt – rt-1) = θ(∆r)       (8) 
From (6) şi (8) we reach the level interest rates must change in order to achieve 
the net foreign assets goal. 









op NFA NFA NFA NFA
r  
Central bank intervention to bring NFAt at the optimum (NFA
op) requires the 
absorption of the excess foreign currency demand. Central bank buys liquidity on 
money market at higher interest rates (higher with ∆r). This is in fact an effort to 
sterilize the excess foreign currency demand, and the cost of the operation is 
encompassed by the following relation: 
  9CA=∆NFA













NFA     (9) 
After we measured the cost of the central bank intervention on money market 
(CA) in order to achieve the optimum level for the NFA, the next section quantifies 
the costs of intervention through administrative measures that restricts capital 
movements. 
 
4. The cost of restricting free movements of capital (administrative 
intervention) 
Where short-term capital movements of exceptional magnitude impose severe 
strains on foreign-exchange markets and lead to serious disturbances in the 
conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies, being reflected in particular in 
substantial variations in domestic liquidity, the opportunity of re-imposing 
restrictions on capital movements might be more efficient than money market 
intervention. The European regulations also leave room for such a possibility 
(Council Directive 88/361/EEC for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty). 
The questions that catch the attention allude to: (i) what substantial variations in 
domestic liquidity actually means, (ii) how we determine the critical moment when 
the clause of abandoning the free movements of capital must be put into practice 
in order to stop the outflows, and (iii) which is the cost of a such measure. 
Imposing restrictions on capital movements is an administrative measure 
undertook by the central bank in order to protect its official reserves, and to 
safeguard the net foreign assets against falling under a certain level. 
If on money market intervention central bank uses market forces in order to 
achieve its aim, on administrative intervention the central bank uses the power of 
the provisions from foreign currency regulation. But some costs arise in this 
situation, too. We explain. 
Central bank carries an official reserves portfolio, or the banking system 
accounts net foreign assets at certain value. The foreign capital outflow might 
  10reduce this value. The central bank searches to avoid the drop in value of the 
NFA or of the official reserves under a critical threshold, laying on capital 
movements restrictions. This mechanism is in fact the purchase by the central 
bank of an option. More precisely, it is a long position on a PROTECTIVE PUT in 
order to hedge the risk the NFA drop below the minimum level. The counterpart 
is the rest of the banking system. Moreover, this option is a down-and-in option (it 
is activated when the barrier is reached). 
The price for buying the option by the central bank is not effectively paid to the 
counterpart. It is like an opportunity cost a central bank must bear as a 
consequence of imposing the exceptional measures to restrict the capital 
movements. 
The option could be exercised when NFA decreases below the critical threshold 
(barrier). In that moment, the central bank decides to preserve the value of the 
NFA and will not authorize capital operations that are not yet free, or will use the 
escape clause mentioned before in order to restrict the capital operations that are 
already free. 
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NFA 
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  11Let us now account the European PUT price, that is the cost regarding imposing 
restrictions on capital movement. 
When the barrier is below the exercise price, the option price is
2: 
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) (  
pdi = PUT option price (CB); 
S = net foreign assets denominated in foreign currency (NFA); 
q = exchange rate growth rate (cs); 
σ = net foreign assets volatility; 
H = the level for the barrier; if NFA drops below H, the option is exercised; 
  12X = exercise price (NFA
op); 
T = maturity of the option. 
In order to quantify the cost of the central bank administrative intervention (CB) 
using relation (10), we have to set up the criterion whereupon H is determined. 
This threshold might be choose either arbitrarily by the monetary authority, 
subject to its risk aversion, or enforcing some conditions for the (µ-cs) element 
from relation (1), or using any other criterion. In the next section we turn into 
practice the theoretical framework assessed in the paper, and the level for H is 
determined using the third above-mentioned criterion, i.e. as a minimum multiple 
of months of imports. 
 
5. Case study - Romania 
In this section we experience the proposed methodology regarding the efficient 
net foreign assets management during the capital liberalization process. 
Romania is the chosen example. Romania aims to become member of the 
European Union in 2007. The economic reforms accomplished in this regard
3, as 
well as the efforts to catch-up the EU members, have raised the productivity and, 
consequently, a real appreciation of the domestic currency was afforded. Taking 
into account also the real positive interest rates, the central bank faces the 
process of capital liberalization as a challenge. The risk of speculative shocks on 
exchange rate is partly diminished due to both the managed float regime
4, and 
the official reserves that continually grew in the last years, as we may see in the 
following chart. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 See Hull, 2001 
3 A macroeconomic framework for Romania is described into the Annex 1 
4 In Romanian Pre-accession Economic Program for 2003 it is mentioned that adopting inflation 
targeting in 2005 implies a gradual transit towards a free float regime 





























Source: NBR Annual Report 2001, NBR Monthly Report no. 12/2002 
 
Capital account liberalization schedule is sequential, and takes into account the 
international theory and practice. The money market operations are planned to 
be the last liberalized (Annex 2). Capital operations that are not free are subject 
to central bank authorizations within an annual bound. Romania also aims to 
accomplish the commitments gone under IMF stand-by agreements, where 
official reserves and net foreign assets are monitored in order to reach a 
minimum level. That is way is germane to consider the optimum level for NFA 
(from relation 1) as an exogenous variable. 
The econometric test regarding relation (5) is described below, and more details 
are presented into Annex 3. Statistical data cover the January 1998 – April 2003 
horizon, with monthly frequency. The reference currency is USD
5. 
The regression of the relation (5) is: 
∆NFAt = 3093 r – 3063 cs 
              (994)     (1006) 
 
Follow-on, for July 2003 – December 2003 horizon we consider the optimum for 
net foreign assets (NFA
op) as an exogenous variable, being undertook from the 
                                                           
5 At March 3, 2003, the NBR has adopted euro as the reference currency for the domestic currency, as a 
natural consequence for the foregone economic evolutions. 
  14IMF stand-by agreement with Romania
6. We carry 5 scenarios that shrunk the 
NFA level with 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, and 25% respectively. For each scenario we 
compute the cost of intervention: on money market, and imposing administrative 
restrictions. Depending on these costs, and taking into account the deflection of 
the NFA from the target, we determine the optimum reaction of a central bank in 
order to efficiently manage the net foreign assets. 
The barrier H related with the possibility on an administrative reaction is assigned 
at 6000 (mil. USD) for the following reason: an empirical condition asks for the 
official reserves to fluctuate around 3-6 months of imports. Consider the 
authorities are risk aversion, and so we choose the most prudent solution for the 
barrier (let the central bank foreign liabilities and the banks net foreign assets be 
zero and establish the minimum limit for the official reserves to be 3 months of 
imports). We get a critical level for H valuing 3 months of imports. Assuming that 
between July 2003 – December 2003 the average level for the Romanian imports 
is 2000 (mil USD) we get H = 6000. The scenarios outcomes regarding the NFA 
evolution and the costs implied by the two types of central bank interventions are 
described in the following tables: 
Table 1: Optimum level for the NFA, and the factual level for NFA according to the five scenarios 
Level NFA  Jun.03  Jul.03  Aug.03  Sep.03  Oct.03  Nov.03  Dec.03 
Optimum (IMF 
agreement)  7060 7308 7556 7804 7765 7726 7658
Shock 1%  6989.4  7234.92 7480.44 7725.96 7687.35 7648.74 7608.15
Shock 5%  6707  6942.6 7178.2 7413.8 7376.75 7339.7 7300.75
Shock 10%  6354  6577.2 6800.4 7023.6 6988.5 6953.4 6916.5
Shock 20%  5648  5846.4 6044.8 6243.2 6212 6180.8  6148
Shock 25%  5295  5481 5667 5853 5823.75 5794.5  5763.75
Note: The shocks represent NFA adverse development by 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, and 25% 
respectively. 
 
Table 2: The intervention cost on money market - CA (relation 9) 
Cost Jun.03  Jul.03  Aug.03  Sep.03  Oct.03  Nov.03  Dec.03 
CA -1%  23.85  31.72 33.05 34.40 4.13 4.07  3.80
CA  -5%  119.27 299.19 315.73 332.68 185.77 183.81 180.77
CA -10%  238.54  949.84 1007.60 1067.04 784.33 776.28 765.99
                                                           
6 In the agreement, the target for net foreign assets is mentioned quarterly. We assume linear evolution 
within the months that build the quarter 
  15CA -20%  477.08  3305.53 3519.82 3740.82 3219.83 3187.24 3149.80
CA - 25%  596.35  5010.56 5340.16 5680.23 5056.77 5005.72 4948.40
Note: These results were reached changing the variables from relation (9) with the results from 
Table 1. The regression of the relation (8) using Romanian data leads us to θ = 0.77 
 
Table 3: The intervention cost by administrative measures to restrict free movements of capital - 
CB (relation 10) 
Cost   Jun.03  Jul.03  Aug.03  Sep.03  Oct.03  Nov.03  Dec.03 
CB -1%  248.59  189.57 133.97 88.72 95.03 101.65  108.93
CB -5%  407.83  333.31 252.85 179.73 190.39 201.40  213.32
CB -10%  691.68  614.60 509.22 395.78 413.40 431.20 450.02
CB -20%  1455.37  1486.06 1448.08 1338.50 1359.95 1379.95  1399.30
CB -25%  1832.48  1949.17 2020.06 2012.88 2019.87 2024.64  2027.27
Note: These results were reached replacing the variables from relation (10) with the results from 
Table 1. The hypotheses for the relation (10) are the following: r = 18%, q = 12%, σ = 0.44, T = 1 
month (1/12), S = NFA values according to the 5 scenarios, H = 6000, X = NFA
op from the 
present month 
 
The figures lay out that an adverse shock against the net foreign assets up to 
20% call forth the central bank reaction on money market, namely increasing the 
interest rates. A shock above 20% on NFA activates the critical barrier of USD 
M6000. This is the moment when the central bank may choose between money 
market intervention and administrative intervention, depending on the costs of 
each type of intervention. For the Romanian situation, the cost analysis assesses 
that exceeding the barrier call for administrative interventions. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Views backed by practice highlight that restricting capital movements is a need 
as long as a country does not fit the minimum conditions regarding a sound 
financial system and a stable economy able to cope with the external shocks. 
The crises from Asia, Latin America or Russia were triggered also by the capital 
movement liberalization problems. Other opinions, also back by practice, argue 
that, in many cases, the harvest of maintaining or imposing new restrictions on 
capital movements is not so efficient in order to fight the capital outflows. 
  16One of the paper’s ideas to use a threshold (as a minimum level the net foreign 
assets may not drop below) exhibits that both above-mentioned solutions to 
manage capital flows are correct, but in different situations. The antithetic views 
are accommodated using the idea of reaction entailed by reaching or not a 
certain threshold (similar to the artificial neuronal network response, if you like). 
Choosing net foreign assets instead of official reserves as a variable for policy-
makers decisions evinced to be useful, because the relation between the balance 
of payments components and net foreign assets is more robust, and has greater 
emphasis in monitoring capital liberalization process. 
The main idea in the paper is that, if the NFA drop (or is an anticipation of 
dropping) below an optimal value (the target), the central bank has two 
alternatives to react: on money market, or using administrative restrictions 
against free movements of capital. The type of reaction will be chosen comparing 
which alternative has a lower cost. Moreover, because restricting capital 
movements is a very brutal measure, the idea of a minimum ceiling for the NFA 
occurs. Thus, the central bank reaction using administrative measures will arise 
as an alternative just in the situation the net foreign assets drop beneath the 
ceiling. 
Concerning the reaction on money market, the central bank from accession and 
acceding countries do not prefer the exchange rate as a tool of intervention, in 
order not to jeopardize the nominal and real convergence processes. The 
interest rates are almost exclusively the preferred tool. 
The econometric test for the methodology framed in the paper uses Romanian 
data, and employs 5 scenarios regarding the adverse evolution for the net foreign 
assets. The results exhibit that a negative shock on NFA up to 20% is advisable 
to be counteracted on money market intervention, increasing the interest rates. A 
shock higher than 20% activates the critical barrier (USD M6000). The analysis 
of the alternative costs leads, for Romania, to the administrative intervention 
solution. 
  17Taking into account that the fall of the net foreign assets more than 20% is a low 
probability development, we conclude that the capital account liberalization 
(commitment that goes under the EU-Romania negotiations within Chapter 4 – 
Free movements of capital) may go on without important difficulties, at least in a 
short-term horizon, respectively for the second stage of the capital liberalization 
schedule (see Annex 2). As long as the variables from the model change (the 
imports, the exchange rate volatility, etc.), a new analysis should be conveyed in 
order to assess the new conditions for the third stage of the capital liberalization 
schedule. This analysis also asserts if the administrative intervention of the 
central bank is any longer necessary. 
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  20ANNEXES 
 
Annex 1: Romania – statistical data (1990-2002) 
                            1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
  (percent of GDP) 
Current  account                            -8.0 -4.7 -7.8 -4.7 -1.7 -4.9 -7.4 -6.2 -7.9 -4.1 -3.8 -5.9 -3.4
Capital  account                              8.1 4.5 -1.1 1.1 -0.8 3.5 4.9 -0.6 6.4 1.3 2.7 3.7 5.0
Foreign  direct  investments                            0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.2 1.8 1.2 3.7 5.3 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.4
  (months of imports, end of period) 
Foreign assets
  ...                          1.3 1.5 2.0 3.1 1.9 2.1 3.6 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.9 4.6
  (bl USD*) 
Current  account                            -3.3 -1.3 -1.5 -1.2 -0.5 -1.7 -2.6 -2.2 -3.0 -1.5 -1.4 -2.3 -1.5
Capital  account                            3.1 1.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 1.2 1.7 1.0 2.7 0.5 1.2 1.5 2.3
Foreign  direct  investments                            0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.4 1.2 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
Gross  international  reserves                            1.4 1.3 1.5 1.7 3.1 2.6 3.1 4.7 3.8 3.6 4.9 6.4 8.4
  (percent change, December/December) 
Real  GDP                          -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 4.0 7.2 3.9 -6.1 -4.8 -2.3 1.6 5.3 4.7
p
Consumer  prices  index                            4.7 222.8 199.2 295.5 61.8 27.7 56.9 151.4 40.6 54.8 40.7 30.3 17.8
Nominal exchange rate  (ROL/USD)  140.4  444.5  143.4  177.4  38.5  45.9  56.5  98.8  36.5  66.7  42.0  21.8  6.0 
Broad  money                            ... 102.2 75.4 143.3 138.1 71.6 66.0 104.9 48.9 44.9 37.9 46.2 38.1
* starting March 3, 2003, euro has become the reference currency for the exchange rate 
Source:   National Bank of Romania Annual Reports, 1995-2001; NBR Monthly Bulletin no. 12/2002. 
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Stages of liberalization  Year  Name of the capital operation 
Liberalization of direct and real 
estate investments abroad by 
residents, as well as of the 
personal capital movements and 
other capital movements. 
(First stage) 
2001  - direct investments abroad by residents; 
- investments in real estate abroad by residents; 
- admission of domestic securities to a foreign capital  market; 
 - loans and short term credits (with maturity less than one year) 
granted by non-residents to residents;   
 - sureties, other guarantees and right of pledge granted   by non-
residents to residents; 
  - personal capital movements representing short term  loans 
granted by non-residents to residents; 
- gifts and endowments; 
- dowries; 
- inheritances and legacies; 
- transfers of assets constituted by residents, in the event of 
emigration, at the time of their installation or during their period of 
stay abroad; 
- death duties; 
- damages (where these can be considered as capital); 
- refunds in the case of cancellation of contracts and  refunds of 
uncalled for payments (where these can be   considered as 
capital); 
- transfers of the money required for the provisions of services (not 
included under operations in current account); 
-  miscellaneous. 
Liberalization of capital movements 
related to insurance contracts and 
other capital movements with 
significant impact on real economy. 
(Second stage) 
2002  - admission of units of national collective investment undertakings 
to a foreign capital market; 
- medium and long term credits related to commercial transactions 
or to the provision of services granted by     residents to non-
residents; 
- premiums and payments in respect with life insurance; 
- premiums and payments in respect with credit  insurance; 
- other transfer of capital in respect with insurance contracts; 
- physical import and export of financial assets representing 
securities. 
  222003  - acquisition by residents of foreign securities dealt in on  a stock 
exchange or not dealt in on a stock exchange; 
- acquisition by residents of units of foreign undertakings dealt in on 
a stock exchange or not dealt in on a stock exchange; 
- financial loans and credits granted by residents to non-residents; 
- sureties, other guarantees and right of pledge granted by 
residents to non-residents; 
- personal capital movements representing loans granted by 
residents to non-residents. 
 
2004  - admission of foreign securities to the domestic capital  market; 
- admission of units of foreign collective investments undertakings 
to the domestic capital market; 
- operations in current and deposit accounts carried out by non-
residents with domestic financial institutions; 
- physical import and export of financial assets representing means 
of payment of every kind. 
Latest by the date of accession 
(Third stage) 
  - acquisition by non-residents of domestic money market securities 
and instruments; 
- acquisition by residents of foreign money market securities and 
instruments; 
- admission of domestic securities and instruments to a foreign 
money market; 
- admission of foreign securities and instruments to the domestic 
money market; 
- operations in current and deposit accounts carried out by 
residents with foreign financial institutions. 
Upon accession    - liberalization of acquiring by the non-resident legal persons from 
EU of land with agricultural and forestry destination, of land 
permanently under water, as well as of land laying outside and 
inside town limit. 
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Dependent Variable: D_NFA 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1998:02 2003:04 
Included observations: 63 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
R 3093.493 994.6803 3.110037 0.0028
CS -3063.449 1006.063 -3.044988 0.0034
R-squared  0.131992     Mean dependent var  68.31104
Adjusted R-squared  0.117762     S.D. dependent var  246.5639
S.E. of regression  231.5913     Akaike info criterion  13.75906
Sum squared resid  3271706.     Schwarz criterion  13.82709
Log likelihood  -431.4103     Durbin-Watson stat  1.996017
 
The residuals are stationary (according to the ADF test), but the normal 
distribution probability is close to zero (Jarque-Bera test). 
 
Null Hypothesis: RESID_ECUATIE has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant 
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=10) 
      t-Statistic    Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -7.876060   0.0000 
Test critical values:  1% level    -3.540198   
 5%  level    -2.909206   
 10%  level    -2.592215   













Mean        0.027810
Median   -9.131419
Maximum   775.3581
Minimum -586.8841
Std. Dev.    229.7160
Skewness    0.873148
Kurtosis    5.092870
Jarque-Bera  19.50284
Probability  0.000058
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